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The alternative influence network (AIN) of far-right YouTubers in Sweden: Connectivity and hybridisation of online extremism during the Covid-19 pandemic

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The alternative influence network (AIN) of far-right YouTubers in Sweden: Connectivity and hybridisation of online extremism during the Covid-19 pandemic

Summary

This paper maps the Swedish far-right “alternative influence network” (AIN) on YouTube during the Covid-19 pandemic (April 2020–March 2022), tracing how 52 channels of influencers, organised groups, and hyper-partisan alternative media interconnect through guest appearances, hyperlinks, and in-video mentions. Combining social network analysis of 1,512 coded videos with qualitative close readings, Askanius, Stoencheva, and Mondani argue that the Swedish far-right has professionalised and hybridised: actors fuse activist propaganda with influencer microcelebrity practices and commercial monetisation, while pandemic-era alliances with the Freedom Movement, anti-vaccine activists, conspiracists, and wellness communities have expanded the ecosystem’s ideological reach. YouTube functions as a “sanitised” gateway that funnels viewers toward alt-tech platforms when moderation tightens.

Key Contributions

  • First systematic mapping of the Swedish-language far-right AIN on YouTube during the pandemic.
  • Extends Lewis’s AIN framework to a Nordic context, adapted to pandemic-era hybridisation with Freedom Movement actors.
  • Empirically operationalises Petersen and Johansen’s hybridisation framework across three levels — actors, practices, and content.
  • Demonstrates the methodological payoff of combining network analysis with qualitative close reading for studying online extremism.
  • Documents the commercial infrastructures (sponsorships, crypto donations, paywalls, merchandise) underpinning far-right influencer economies.
  • Shows how deplatforming reshapes rather than eliminates extremist visibility through coded language, on-screen URLs, and “phantom videos.”

Methods

A mixed-methods design starting from 25 purposefully sampled far-right YouTube channels (groups, influencers, alternative media), expanded by snowball sampling to 52 channels and 8,531 videos. Manual coding of 1,512 videos across three sampled months captured three connective practices: guest appearances, hyperlinking (description and in-video), and in-video mentions (in 347 videos). Directed networks were built and visualised in Gephi, complemented by qualitative close reading of self-branding and monetisation tactics. The analytical frame draws on Lewis’s AIN concept, Petersen and Johansen’s hybridisation model, and Lindgren’s integration of distant and close reading.

Findings

  • Over 90% of analysed videos referenced another AIN actor through at least one connective practice, indicating dense internal connectivity.
  • The guest appearance network (151 nodes, 228 directed links, 480 guest cases) formed star-like clusters around bridging hosts rather than a single tight community.
  • Hyperlinking was the dominant connective practice (6,172 hyperlinks; 294 nodes; 557 directed links), pointing to alternative media, advertisers, and alt-tech platforms.
  • Alternative outlets such as Riks, FriaTider, and Samnytt act as legitimising hubs that host influencers as “alternative experts.”
  • A self-styled “Swedish Tube Family” subcluster (7.3% of nodes, 19.7% of links) produced 55.6% of sampled content through coordinated mutual promotion.
  • In-video mentions were dense and mostly unidirectional (only 17 of 334 ties reciprocal); the Sweden Democrats was the most-mentioned actor.
  • Influencers cultivated parasocial intimacy via strategic authenticity, signature greetings, in-group labels, and consistent branding.
  • Monetisation spanned sponsored content, Swish/PayPal/Bitcoin donations, YouTube Super Chats, Patreon paywalls, and merchandise.
  • Moderation was circumvented through on-screen URLs, misspellings, euphemisms (e.g., “kanelbulle” for vaccines), and redirects to Swebbtube, Rumble, Odysee, and BitChute.
  • The Swedish AIN is transnationally networked with US, UK, and German far-right and pandemic-protest actors, with several Swedish channels operating in English.

Connections

This paper sits alongside other work on platformed far-right influence networks and the hybridisation of extremism with mainstream and lifestyle content. It resonates particularly with Rothut2026-wt and Nangle2026-yo on the dynamics of online radicalisation ecosystems, and with Bouchafra2026-ts and Karo2026-dn on how digital platforms structure far-right communication; Bailard2024-pj is a further point of comparison for platform-level analyses of political extremism.

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