How propaganda exploits the infrastructure of truth: A case study of IStandWithPutin
Summary
This paper presents a case study of the IStandWithPutin hashtag campaign to advance a conceptual argument about contemporary propaganda. Graham contends that pro-Kremlin influence operations do not simply circumvent or oppose truth-verification systems on social media — they actively parasitize them. The very platform affordances designed to enable credible, authentic discourse (hashtags, algorithmic amplification, verification signals) become the infrastructure through which propaganda gains reach and the appearance of legitimacy. The paper thus reframes propaganda analysis as an infrastructural problem rather than a content problem.
Key Contributions
- Develops the conceptual claim that propaganda exploits, rather than evades, the “infrastructure of truth” on platforms.
- Provides empirical grounding for this argument via a case study of IStandWithPutin.
- Bridges critical media studies with disinformation and platform studies, offering a framework for analyzing how influence operations co-opt platform architecture.
Methods
A case study approach centered on the IStandWithPutin hashtag, combining social media data analysis with a critical media studies framing. The empirical material is read through a theoretical lens that foregrounds platform infrastructures, trust signals, and algorithmic affordances as the site of contestation.
Findings
- The campaign displayed hallmarks of coordinated propaganda activity.
- Trust-supporting platform features were instrumentalized to amplify pro-Kremlin narratives.
- Propaganda effectiveness derived from mimicking and co-opting the structural and semiotic affordances of authentic discourse, not from straightforwardly producing falsehoods.
Connections
This work sits alongside other empirical studies of pro-Kremlin and state-aligned influence operations, particularly Kuznetsova2025-nu and DeVerna2025-dl, which similarly examine how propaganda travels through platform mechanics. Its infrastructural framing resonates with broader theorizations of coordinated inauthentic behavior and platform exploitation in Starbird2025-jj, Luceri2025-tr, and Marwick2025-ov, and complements Graham2026-fb as part of the author’s wider research program on platformed influence operations.