Cultural Imaginaries and Framings of Generative AI
The press as an imaginary-producing institution
A substantial cluster of these papers treats journalism not as a passive mirror of AI development but as a site where sociotechnical imaginaries are actively co-produced. Nguyen2026-vm offers the most granular account, mapping 18,032 articles across 15 outlets to show that mentalistic-agentic framings of LLMs—language attributing minds, intentions, or feelings to chatbots—are real but far from hegemonic, cutting across technical, ambivalent, and critical registers that depend more on outlet and journalist practice than on national culture. This nuance qualifies the more totalizing claims found in work on “AI hype”: Dodds2026-df reframes hype not as a discursive bubble but as an infrastructural force embedded in journalism’s community of practice, redistributing legitimacy through sourcing patterns that privilege tech executives and erase labor, environmental costs, and alternative futures. Where Nguyen et al. find editorial variation resisting a single master narrative, Dodds et al. insist that hype’s systemic effects persist regardless of individual journalists’ critical intentions—two compatible but differently calibrated diagnoses of how much agency journalism retains within a techno-capitalist master frame.
Wang2025-zy extends this comparative impulse cross-nationally, operationalizing Cave and Dihal’s hopes/fears framework to show that UK, US, Chinese, and Indian coverage diverges systematically along national political-economic lines—a finding that resonates with Nguyen et al.’s observation that Asian outlets foreground education and industrial application while European/North American outlets foreground risk and ethics. Together these studies suggest the “global AI imaginary” is less a monolith than a set of regionally inflected variations on shared utopian/dystopian tropes, concentrated overwhelmingly around a few symbolic objects (ChatGPT above all). Weinbrand2026-sf narrows this comparative-discursive method to a single contested artifact, Google’s AI Overviews, showing how platform, journalistic, and SEO-industry actors stage competing legitimations of generative AI as epistemic authority—with the user’s voice and societal costs conspicuously absent, echoing Dodds et al.’s point about hype’s systematic invisibilities.
Industry self-narration and the geography of discourse
A second strand turns from press coverage to the imaginaries industry produces about itself. Stanusch2026-ec dissects the Sam Altman controversy as a moment when industry-internal imaginaries—Longtermism, Regulatory Ambivalence, Techno-Hagiography—surfaced and were managed through “premediation” and “preclusion,” strategies that displace present harms into speculative futures or absorb critique as something only the industry itself can resolve. This dovetails with Hepp2026-oi’s ethnographic account of Silicon Valley’s “quiet futuring,” which argues that the loud CEO-driven imaginary analyzed by Stanusch and others draws on a deeper reservoir of ideas circulating in Bay Area communities—Effective Altruism, Rationalism—organized around AGI timelines, job loss, and geopolitical competition. Both papers converge on the finding that industry discourse performs depoliticization (appearing apolitical, externalizing accountability to the future) while being constitutively political. Richter2026-bt’s longitudinal Twitter analysis supplies the historical backstory to this landscape, showing that the individualized, influencer-driven US discourse Hepp and Stanusch describe is the end point of a decade-long drift from media/lay dominance toward industry and then tech-influencer dominance—a trajectory starkly different from Germany’s institutionalization toward academia and advocacy, suggesting that today’s imaginaries are path-dependent on which stakeholders captured the conversation early.
Trust, disclosure, and the audience’s reception of the imaginary
Where the above papers examine imaginaries’ production, Suk2026-ai and Mattis2026-gu examine their uptake, asking how publics come to trust (or distrust) generative AI as an information medium. Suk et al. propose a multilevel theoretical scaffold borrowed from mass- and social-media trust research, while Mattis et al. supply an empirical counterpart, demonstrating that task-specific AI disclosures in journalism uniformly depress trust, with penalties scaling by task sensitivity (fact-checking worst, idea generation least) and moderated by political position and AI literacy. Read against the hype/imaginary literature, these findings suggest that however industry and press discourse frame generative AI’s capabilities, audience trust is governed by a separate, more skeptical logic—one in which disclosure itself, rather than the content it discloses, becomes the salient cultural signal.
Theorizing AI as agent and as medium
Running beneath these empirical studies are more foundational, theory-building interventions. Anicker2024-vp reframes the recurring question of whether AI “has” agency as a category error: agency is not a technical property to be discovered but a socially granted and monitored license, which reorients the entire debate over mentalistic framing (as in Nguyen et al.) away from asking whether LLMs “really” think and toward asking under what social conditions they are licensed to act as if they do. Manovich2026-ih pursues a parallel but distinct move, bracketing ethical and social critique altogether to theorize generative AI strictly as a medium—finding it uniquely defined by a “built-in” cognitive capacity and encyclopedic media cognition, yet structurally conservative and resistant to avant-garde defamiliarization. Manovich’s insistence on medium-specific properties offers a useful counterweight to the discourse-analytic papers above: where Nguyen, Wang, and Dodds et al. ask how AI is talked about, Manovich asks what, formally, the medium itself does and does not afford—a question largely orthogonal to, but implicitly in tension with, claims about AI’s open-ended “agentic” framing in news and industry discourse.
Slop, affect, and the aesthetics of degeneration
A final cluster turns to the devalued aesthetic register of generative culture—slop, brainrot, slopaganda—extending the imaginaries framework into affect and vernacular reception. Galip2026-ix theorizes slop and brainrot through Ngai’s gimmick, arguing these forms work simultaneously “too little” and “too hard,” exposing contradictions of production and consumption under “too late capitalism.” Topinka2026-hb narrows the lens to political content, arguing that “slopaganda” operates not through deception (as with deepfakes) but through affective attunement—AI models as “ideological attunement machines” that intensify rather than disrupt existing ideological formations. Li2026-zv complements these theory-driven accounts with a grounded, user-centered study, showing that ordinary Reddit users conceptualize slop as a fuzzy, contested category spanning constitutional defects, algorithmic overreach, resistance, and—complicating purely negative readings—genuine entertainment and technostalgia. These three papers collectively extend Bucher2017-qh’s earlier concept of the “algorithmic imaginary”—the idea that algorithms are experienced affectively, in moments of breakdown and surprise, rather than known technically—into the generative-AI era, suggesting a continuous lineage from folk theorizing about Facebook’s feed to folk theorizing about slop: both are sites where ordinary affect, rather than expert discourse, becomes the primary mode through which algorithmic/generative systems are culturally metabolized.
Synthesis
Across this body of work, a layered picture of generative AI’s cultural imaginary emerges: industry actors narrate themselves as inevitable, apolitical stewards of the future (Stanusch, Hepp, Richter); journalism oscillates between amplifying and critically filtering that narrative, itself structured by sourcing and institutional hype dynamics (Nguyen, Dodds, Wang, Weinbrand); audiences receive these framings with persistent skepticism (Suk, Mattis) while simultaneously generating their own vernacular, affect-laden conceptualizations from the ground up (Bucher, Li, Topinka, Galip); and underneath all of this, foundational theoretical work (Anicker, Manovich) asks what kind of thing—agent, medium—generative AI actually is, independent of how it is discursively packaged. The through-line is that no single imaginary dominates: hope and fear, hype and skepticism, loud futuring and quiet futuring, elite narrative and folk resistance coexist and co-constitute each other, making the “cultural imaginary” of generative AI less a settled ideology than an ongoing, contested field of framings.